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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
Three cas·es which were consolidated for trial in the
district court, have been consolidated on appeal to this
court. The defendant in each case is the Hartford AcciSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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dent & Indemnity Company which was the surety on a
contract bond of Cassady Company and C. P. Cassady
. .
.'
as principal.s. In two of these cases, it is the appellant
and in the third case it is the respondent and crossappellant. In this brief we shall refer to it as the Hartford. This brief is written as though the Hartford were
the appellant in each case, since the points raised by it
on its cross-appeal in the Felt case, are similar to those
raised on its direct appeal in the other two cases.
The plaintiffs in each of the three cases are the three
na1ned obligees on the bond. The plaintiff, Prudential
Federal Savings & Loan Association, is designated in
the bond, as the lender obligee, and is herein referred
to as Prudential Federal. The plaintiff Pacific Coast
Title Insurance Compan3~, is designated in the bond as
the title obligee, and in this brief will be referred to as
the Title Company. The plaintiff~ Felt Syndicate, Inc.~
is a Nevada Corporation, designated in the bond as the
owner obligee, and is herein referred to simply as Felt.
As above noted, the principals on the bond were
Ca ~sady Co1np.any, Inc.. , a corporation of the State of
lTtah, and (~. P. Cassady. For purposes of these actions,
thP~T n1ay be considered as one, and the na1ne Cassady
~hall hP used herein to dc·8igna te eitl1er or both unless
by contPxt a diffPrl•nt Ulc·a.ning is c.Ie.arly n1ade to appear.
AnotlH'r JH'r~on not .a party to this litigation, to ·which
frPqll<'llt rpferl'llCl' \Yill be 1nade is . .A.ssoeiated Accountants, a co-parbH:)rship, hereinafter referred to as Accountants.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

3
The records on appeal 1n these cases consist of
various p.apers, pleadings, orders, etc., filed and entered
in each of the three cases, and a transcript of the testimony and trial proceedings together with certain exhibits received in evidence. In preparing the records
on appeal, the Clerk prepared a separate folder and
record for e.ach case insofar as the papers and pleadings were concerned. However, there is only one transcript which is part of the record on appeal in all three
cases. It is numbered in red numerals as part of the
record in the Title Company case. Thus the record in
the Title Company case as numbered and indexed by the
Clerk, consists of 27 pages nun1bered consecutively from
1 to 27 plus the transcript vvhose p.ages are numbered
in red from 28 to 452. The Prudential Federal record
consists of 54 pages numbered consecutively from 1 to
54, and the Felt re-cord consists of 59 p~ages, numbered
consecutively from 1 to 59.
In order to avoid confusion all references to the
transcript in this brief shall be indicated by the letter
T. followed by the page number e.g. (T. 51). The number shall refer to the typewritten number rather than
the red number. Thus page T.51 also bears the red number 79. References to the separate records of the individual cases shall be designated by the case na1ne, the
letter R., and the page number e.g. (Prud-Fed. R. l,
Felt R. 7, Tit. Co. R. 3. etc.).
THE FACTS
These cases arise out of the following facts:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The promoters of Felt became interested in building
a subdivision on a tract of land known as Morningside
Heights Subdivision in Salt Lake County, in late 1949 or
early 1950 (T. 228). Mr. Lloyd Broadhurst, one of the
original promoters, contacted C. P. Cassady and C. J.
Cassady, his son, who were builders in and around Arcadia, Calif., to determine whether they would be interested
in building a one hundred unit subdivision (T. 228).
The Cassadys were interested, and in about February
of 1950, they ,came to Salt Lake City for the purpose
of examining the tract, at which time they became acquainted with other promoters of Felt, and further
di_scussed the prospective building program. (T. 229,
305).
At that time Felt provided the Cassadys with some
.plans and specifications of homes to be built on the
subdivision. The Cassadys took these plans back to their
place of busines.s in California, and they were redrawn
and redrafted hy Cassady's own architects. (T. 229,
335). The purpose of this was so that Cassady would
know exactly what materials and construction would
be required. ( T. 335-336). After the plans and SpBcifications were redrafted by Ca.ssady they were returned
to Mr. B. D. Scott of Felt, 'vho approved them. (T.
231, 336, 339). S·cott submitted the plans to the \7"eterans
Administration for approval .and subsequently the \ 7eterans Administration issued its certificates (Reasonable
values; C.R.V.s.), to the effect that homes built according to such plans and specifi~eations 'vould be approved
for G.I. loans up to a stated value. (T. 337-340). Scott
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advised the Cassadys that the plans and specifications
conformed to all local requiren1ents of the Veterans Administration and with local building codes. ( T. 231, 299).
F·elt contemplated financing the entire project
through .a regular lending institution. On June 16, 1950,
it entered into a contract with Prudential Federal, hereinafter referred to as the loan agreement, wherein the
financial arrangements were outlined (Ex. Pr.-7). Under
the terms of that agreement Prudential Federal agreed
to lo.an to each owner and purchaser of the 100 lots
in Morningside Heights Subdivision, funds in a specific
amount, to be used in the construction and erection of a
dwelling house and appurtenant improvements. The
mort~age loans were to be made in accordance with the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act of 1944, popularly
known as the G.I. Bill of Rights. As a prerequisite to
making the lo.an, Prudential Federal required that certain things be done, among which were the following:
(1) that the mortgage loan be approved by Prudential
Insurance Company of America, (not to be confused with
Prudential Federal); (2) that an ap·proved A.T.A. Title
insurance policy showing title to the mortg.aged real
estate in the bororwer, free and clear of all liens and
incumb:vances, except the lien for general taxes, be issued;
(3) that the borrower pay a cash deposit to Prudential
Feder.al to cover certain administrative and loan costs;
(4) that the borrower authorize Prudential Federal in
writing to make certain charge.s against the loan proceeds; (5) that the plans and survey of the homes be
approved by the Veterans Administration; and (6) that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the borrower execute to Prudential Federal written
authority to disburse the loan proceeds to pay course
of construction costs on the home. The contract further
provided in detail, as to the various stages of the completion of the home when disbursement of the mortgage
loans would be made, e.g. 14% when the subfloor of
the dwelling had been installed; 16% when the dwelling
was to the square; 16% when the d\velling was roughed in,
etc. (Ex. Pr-7).
The contract further provided that all the 100 homes
would be com_pleted within 180 days of the date of the
agreement, and that failure on the part of Felt to complete within that time, would give Prudential Federal
the right, upon ten days written notice, and at its election, to enter upon the real estate and complete or alter
the dwelling house to comply with plans and _specifications and for this purpose to use all of the loan proceeds and the payments. The contract further provided
in detail the mechanical processes by \Yhich the parties
under the contract would function. Included among these
provisions was a pTovision for a bonded disbursing
agency to make disbursements of the loan proceeds among
Cassady, F:elt and subcontractors and 1naterialmen according to directions to be provided. Thus, Prudential
Federal would n1ake disburse1nents to Accountants in a
lump stun figure, and Accountants \vould then take
the responsibility for disbursing the funds among the
various persons entitled to then1. It \Vas specifically
provided in paragraph 2 of Artic.Ie III that Accountants
would .Secure fron1 all laborers and rna terial1nen and subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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contractors, written lien waivers at the time of making
payment to them, said waivers to cover in toto the
amount of the particular disburse·ment of the loan proceeds made by Prudential Federal to Accountants. The
contract then provided "such lien waivers shall be delivered to Prudential prior to any further disbursement
by Prudential and Prudential will be under no obligation
to make further disbursements until it .shall have received lien waivers covering all p·rior disbursements."
(Ex. Pr-7). (Emphasis ours).
Prior to the execution of the foregoing contract,
construction work on a few homes had commenced some
time in May or June of 1950. ( T. 33, 59, 60, 318-319, 324).
It appears that basement excavations had been dug upon
perhaps a dozen or two of the 100 units. (T. 33, 59, 60,
318-319, 324). This work was performed by one Ross, a
subcont~actor. of Felt and not of Cassady. (T. 330). During this period of ti1ne however, Cassady was negotiating with Felt for a construction contr.act. (T. 328).
A serious problem which entered into the negotiations was lack of adequate financing on the part of
Cassady. (T. 37, 324, 326, 328). Cassady originally proposed to furnish what is known as a supervisal bond in
the penal sum of $100,000. (Depositions of C. P. Cassady,
Deco Van Horn, Jr., and A. L. Blackburn, Exs. 39, 40,
41; T. 232). However, this was not acceptable to Prudential Fede·ral. (T. 35, 412). Prudential Federal's attorneys
prepared a form of bond which they deemed adequate
for the protection of their intere.st and which was deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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livered to C.assady, and by him to his insurance agent
in California. (T. 401, 403-405, 408, 419, 420; Exs. 38,
39, 40, 41). The bond finally issued by the Hartford
was, in all respects material to this litigation, in the
same form as the bond prepared by Prudential Federal's
attorney. (Ex. Pr-7, H-38).
During this pe-riod of time Felt was negotiating with
another contr.actor, and until the time Ca.ssady actually
signed the construction contract, it was questionable
whether ~c·assady or the other ·contractor would eventually get the job of building the 100 homes. (T. 328, 329).
Finally these problems were worked out to the satisfaction of the various parties, and on July 19, 1950,
Cassady entered into a contract with Felt, which is herein.after referred to a.s the Construction Contract. (Ex.
Pr-2). Under the terms of that agreement, Cassady
agreed "to supervise, co-ordinate and procure, the construction of a total of 100 houses upon contiguous lots,"
(emphasis ours), in Morningside Heights Subdivision.
It w~s agreed that such homes would be built in strict
conformity with the plans and specifications, and in
conformity with any plans, duties and obligations required by any governmental agency having the right
to demand that said work should be performed in the
manner sp·e'cified by sueh agency, and also in accordance
with the rules and regul_ations of the Veterans Administration. By p.aragraph 15 it 'Yas provided that neither
party would ~ssign, transfer or pledge, in whole or in
part, the agreement or any of its rights or obligations
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the-reunder. without the written consent of the other
party first had and obtained. (Ex. Pr-2).
By paragraph 2.2, the number of houses to be built
acording to each basic floor plan was specified, together
with the cost per unit and it was further provided in
said paragraph that if the parties should thereafter
agree to any change or altera.tion.s in the plans or specific.ations, and if such change should increase the cost of
construction of the unit affected by such change, such
inereased cost would be added to the cost per house
therein agreed upon. (Ex. Pr-2).
Paragraph 23 provided among other things, the
schedule of payments following the cour.se of construction schedule. This is at slight variance with the schedule
of payments set forth in the loan agreement. This p~ara
gr.aph further provided inspections would be made at
intervals not to exceed 15 days, and that the payments
therein provided would be made within five days after
the inspection. It was further provided as follows : "The
foregoing schedule is to be used as a general guide. However, it is agreed that disbursements will be made to
second party and the subcontractors in accordance with
the actual stage of completion of each dwelling within
five days after the inspections are made." (Emphasis
ours).
By paragraph 24 of the same agreement Felt obligated itself to furnish and p·rocure ,a power connection.
By paragraph 26, Cassady agreed to commence construction under the contract within ten days from the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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date of execution, and to cause the same to be carried
forward diligently and expeditiously until all of the 100
houses h.ad been completed, and to complete all of the
100 houses within 180 days from the date of execution
of the agreement. (Ex. Pr-2).
On July 21, the Hartford issued its bond naming
the three plaintiffs as obligees. (Ex. Pr-1). The last
whereas clause of the bond recites:
"WHEREAS, the LENDER OBLIGEE, TITLE
OBLIGEE, and OWNER OBLIGEE each de.sire protection as their interest may apear, in the event of default
by the PRINCIPAL under said contr.act, said protection to be subject to the performance by the LE};1DER
OBLIGEE, the TITLE OBLIGEE and the OTr}'ER
OBLIGEE of their respective obligat·ions to the PRINCIPAL in connection with said contract; .... " (Emphasis ours).
The bond was conditioned as follows:
"NOW, THEREFORE, the condition of
this obligation is such that, if the PRINCIPAL
well and truly p·erforn1s all of the undertakings,
covenants, conditions and agreen1ents of said contr.act on its part and fully indemnifies and saves
harmless the obligees from alllos.s, costs, damage,
and exp~ense which they may suffer, either jointly
and severally, by reason of failure so to do, and
fully reimburses and repays obligees all outlay
and expense which said obligees may incur in
making good any such default~ and further, if
the PRINCIPAL shall pay all persons who have
contracted, or will have contracted, directly with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

11
PRINCIPAL for services or labor or materials
furnished under the provisions of said contract,
and shall keep and maintain each lot or buildingsite free .and clear of labor and materiallien.s, then
this obligation shall be void; otherwise, it shall
remain in full force and effect." (Ex. Pr-1).
On page 2 of the bond the following provision 3
was set forth:
"The SURETY shall not be liable under the
Bond to the Obligees, and either of them, unless
the Obligees, or either of them , shall make payment to the PRINCIPAL in reasonable compliance with the terms of said contract as to payments, and each shall perform all other obligations
to be performed by each obligee under said contract at the time and in the manner therein set
forth." (Emphasis ours.)
The provision last quoted, is of crucial importance
to the determination of these cases. It is significant
that this language i.s identical to that contained in the
bond form pTepared by Prudential Federal's attorneys.
It is Prudential Federal's language. (Ex. Pr-8, Pr-38).
On August 10, 1950, Felt, Cassady, Accountants and
Prudential Federal entered into a four party agreement,
hereinafter referred to as the disbursal agreement. (Ex.
Pr-8). This agreement provided in detail for the mechanics of disbur.sing the mortgage funds among the
various parties entitled to receive the same. Paragraph
4 thereof reiterated the provisions of the loan agreement, requiring Accountants to obtain lien waivers from
the laborers .and materialmen, and to deliver the same
to Prudential Federal before the latter firm would be
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under any obligation to make further disbursements of
loan proceeds. Paragraph 6 provided that in the event
that inspections made by the Veterans Administration
and Prudential Feder.al would disclose that the construction of any dwelling did not conform with the plans
and specifications, Prudential Federal might withhold
further disbursements of funds in connection with such
dwelling house until corrections have been made to
make such dwelling conform with plans and _specifications. (Ex. Pr-8). Paragraph 5, together with Exhibit
B attached to said agreement, provided in minute detail
as to the exact percentage of completion represented
by each phase of the work; and further provided that
work should be inspected every two weeks, and that
within five days thereafter Cassady should be paid for
work done to the date of inspection. For example, excav.ation and grading repre.sented 1.82% of the total work;
concrete foundation represented 4.17% of the work; and
the foundation complete represented 9.09% of the work.
Under the terms of this agreement, as well as under
the terms of the construction agreen1ent, Cassady \vas
entitled to be paid the exact percentage \vhich he had
earned up to the time of each inspection.
Paragraphs 11 and 12 provided for con1pensation
of Accountants by Ca.ssady, and Felt. Paragraph 13
provided that the compensation provided was based upon
the assumption that inspections \vould be made not
oftener than two weeks, and that there would be 12 to
14 periods of disbursement. In the event of more frequent insp.ections, or 1nore disbu1~sement periods than
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14, Accountants would be paid a reasonable compensation
for such additional work. (Ex. Pr-8).
Promptly upon the execution of the construction
agreement Cassady entered upon the performance of
his obligations thereunder. (T. 232, 233, 332). He immediately ran into difficulties. (T. 233). Felt f.ailed to
provide a power connection which it had agreed to provide in the construction agreement. ( T. 197, 233, 313 ;
Ex. H-32). As a re.sult, Cassady was put to the expense
of procuring a gasoline po\vered electric generator at
a cost to him of $2,137.44. (T. 197, 233, 240; Ex. H-32).
Water was not .available as agreed and surveys were
slow. (T. 233).
More serious, was the failure of Felt's sales program to keep pace with the construction progran1. Although C~ssady understood that the homes were practically all sold at the time th·e construetion agreement
was entered into, such was not the case. (T. 233, 257).
Prudential Federal refused to disburse loan proceeds
for any particular unit until an A. T .A. title policy had
issued, and a mortgage had been executed by the purchaser-borrower and recorded. (T. 250). In some instance.s this was not .accomplished until December of
1950, at a time when the construction work should have
been virtually completed. ( T. 38, 62, 105 ; Ex. Pr-36).
This problem was further aggravated by cancellations
by some veteran borrowers due to delay in prosecuting
the work, thus occasioning further delay in locating,
selling and signing a new veteran borrower. (T. 39, 323).
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There were also cancellations and delays due to the
Prudential Insurance Company refusing to approve some
of the veteran purchasers. ( T. 322, 323).
From the very outset there was a deficiency of
monies. (T. 64, 65, 67, 235, 236, 2'58, 321, 347; Ex.s H13-15). The project was "thirsting'' for neeessary money.
( T. 64). At the time of the fir.st insp·ection Cassady
received but .a very small fraction of the funds he was
entitled to receive· in accordance with the actual stage of
construction. (T. 235, 258, Ex. H-32). After one month
of work, Cassady had earned approximately $80,000
and had been paid only about $7,000. (Ex. H-32). He
of course, made complaint .about this, but there was
no other money available at that time because the sales
program and mortgage recording program were badly
behind schedule. (T. 62, 65, 67, 262, 347; Ex.s H-32-H34, Pr-36).
The project wa.s designed to be accomplished by mass
production methods. Cassady could not economically
jump about the project from lot to lot as n1ortgages
were recorded. Econon1ical completion 'vithin the time
contemplated by the contract, den1anded that the houses
be built in straight line order. (T. 332). Not having
received the monies to "\vhich he was entitled, Cassady
did not have .sufficient funds to p.ay his laborers and
material suppliers. (T. 66, 67, 236, 347: Exs. H-32-33).
They became dissatisfied and threatened to discontinue
furnishing labor and nu1terials. ( T. 67, 236, 268: Exs.
H-13-15). The condition persisted, and the attitude of
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the subcontractors and materialmen bec.ame more difficult. (T. 67, 236; Ex.s H-32-33). Many of the1n refu.sed
to continue performance and Cassady was required to
find other materialmen in lieu thereof. ( T. 236; Ex.s
H-32, 33).
A good example of how this worked out is a random
sample taken by the witness H. M. C.alvert from the
records of Prudential Federal. The first payment or
disbursement of mortgage funds on Lot No. 161 was
$3,398.40. (T. 378; Ex. Pr-36). The amount of this payment indicates that the home was more than one-third
completed at that time. Under Cassady's contract he
would have been entitled to several progress payments
before that time. (T. 379). How-ever, because no mortgage had been reeorded, he did not receive these badly
needed payments, at the time when they -vvould have
done the Inost good. (T. 250, 251, 378-379). The exact
language of Mr. Cassady on this point, colorfully, if
not grammatically, describes the problem.
"A. The tract was started in July or the
first of August of 1950. Due to lack of payments
from that period of time u.ntil the end of the year
caused the tract to be the complete fiasco that
it was. By that I me.an in time. Once a tract and
once a situation i.s involved such that adequate
financing is not given, as per agreed upon, the
men doing the work would have to go out and
seek some othe·r means of finding money to meet
their immediate needs. This happeoned espe-cially
at a had time; because of the Korean War supplies and materials be!came scarce. If supply
houses were not getting money at the proper
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time, they were not going to advance but so much
credit. Th·e whole transaction and project was not
only hampered, but you might say, the conclusion
that has come about because of the lack of p~roper
and adequate financing, according to the contract,
regardless of any subsequent action - I mean,
nothing could change that lemon into an orange.
I mean you just don't make those changes. The
whole hinge of that tract for six-months' tjme
because of that type of financing, was the ultimate cour.se of how it went." (T. 236-7). (Emphasis ours.)
All of this occurred at a particularly inopportune
time. The Korean War had broken out in June of 1950
with a resultant scarcity in building materials. (T. 158,
236-237). Suppliers were naturally n1ore willing to serve
those who could pay cash. (T. 158, 236-237). Although
Cassady had contracts with most of his laborers and
materialmen, they ju_stifiably refused to perform when
they could not be paid. (T. 236-37; Exs. H-32,33). Cassady then had to go into the open market and make
purchases at prices inflated by wartime pressures. He
estimated the cost of this at $17,500. (T. 24-±). He 'vas
further handicapped by not having the funds to buy
in wholesale quantities, and to achieve the benefit of
discount.s for cash sales. (T. 158, 2±4). This could have
amounted to a "considerable saving." (T. 158). The
gravity of the situation 'vas recognized by all concerned
with the project. (Exs. H-13, 1±, 15). Cassady complained
to Accountants that ·every disbursal ""'"as insufficient.
(Ex. H-34). He repeatedly wrote to Felt, .advising it, of
the situation and pointing out that the succes.s of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
project was imperiled. (Exs. H-13, 14, 15). Felt likewise
recognized the gravity of the situation and directed it
to the attention of Prudential Federal. (Exs. fi-13, 14,
15). Notwithstanding this, the situation failed to improve materially. (T. 236).
Eventually Cass.ady found it necessary to engage
the services of attorneys to bring the matter to a head.
(T. 268; Ex. H-32). The attorneys wrote letters to Felt
(T. 268; Ex. I-I-32), and this finally resulted in the execution of a supplementary and modifying agreement
dated S·eptembe~r 20, 1950. (Ex. Pr-5). By the provisions
of that agreement, the period for completion was extended to 210 days from the date of the original construction agreement. (Ex. Pr-5). No other changes were
made.
The execution of this agreement did not materially
improve the situation. ( T. 236, 268). The sales p~rogram
and mortgage recording program continually lagged behind the progre.ss of construction and this condition
persisted throughout the fall of 1950. ( T. 64, 65, 67,
236, 268; Ex. Pr-36).
Notwithstanding the financial difficulties and other
hardships and impediments resulting from Felt's
breaches, Cassady attempted to go forward and complete the project. Initially satisfactory progress was
maintained. ( T. 141, 259-2.60). Although delays were encountered, the rough work was completed satisfactorily.
(T. 69, 141, 145, 155, 259; Ex. F-24). So far as the record
shows all of the 100 houses passed their first inspection
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satisfactorily and most of them passed the second inspection satisfactorily. (Ex. F-24). Note: Ex. F-24 does not
contain first .and second inspection reports for all of
the 100 homes. However, all those in the record show
full compliance with the first inspection, and mo.st of
them show compliance with the second inspection.
However, as time went on, difficulties increased.
c·assady had difficulty in meeting obligations to subcontractors and materialmen due to insufficiency of
progress payments to him. Organiz.ation broke down
and gave '\vay to chaos. (T. 157, 158). The inevitable result \vas that the quality of work deteriorated. For example, substandard materials were furnished by dissatisfied material suppliers; lumber \vas not promptly
worked giving rise to problems of deterioration by
weather and theft; and lumber, p·roperly installed, was
not promptly painted, causing warping, etc. (T. 153155). Although the.se defects were noted by the inspector,
and due notice thereof was given to Prudential Federal,
it did not hold up any progress payments, and did absolutely nothing to require compliance "~th \' . . ._:\_. standards
by Cassady. (T. 68, 70, 71, 156, 157; Ex. F-34). The
errors were thus compounded and piled one on top of
the other.
Another difficulty resulting fron1 the delays in payment and extension of time for building the homes,
was that mortgage funds \Yhich should have been used for
construction work were necessarily diverted to course of
construction interest. At the inception of the project, the
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veteran borrowers were required to pay .a deposit \vhich
included enough to cover anticipated interest on the
borrowed moneys during the anticipated and scheduled
course of construction. (Ex. Pr-7). I-Iowever, because
the time for completion was so long delayed, a portion
of the loan proceeds had to be applied for this purpose.
In other words, course of construction interest became
a much larger item than originally planned and contenlplated. As a result approximately $16,000 of money
which should have been available for payment of construction costs, went out of one pocket of Prudential
Federal and into the other as course of construction
intere,st. ( T. 177-184) .
By February of 1951, the project had completely
bogged down. On February 16, 1951, Prudential Federal,
Felt, Cassady and Accountants, entered into a new agreement hereinafter called the Supplemental Agreement.
(Ex. Pr-6). By the terms of that agreement the period
for completion of the construction was e~xtended to
June 1, 1951. All of the prior agreements of the several
parties were amended to conform to that. Accountants
were relieved of further obligation to make disbursements and it was provided that from that time on Prudential Federal would disburse the mortgage funds "in
such manner and in such amounts as in the sole judgment
and discretion of Prudential is necessary and proper
to secure the expeditious completion of the aforesaid
dwelling houses . . . The discretion of Prudential as to
the time manner and method and amount of payments
'
shall be conclusive, and shall be binding upon the parties
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hereto." (Emphasis ours..) Pru·dential Federal's right to
declare the project in default by serving a ten day "\Vritten notice on Felt wa.s preserved. The Hartford consented to the execution of this agreement to the extent
that it modified the construction contract of July, 1950.
(Ex. Pr-6).
From the date of the supplemental agreement, to
February of 1952, there is something of a hiatus in
the record. There is little evidence to show what transpired during that period of time. From Ex. F-24, it
appe&rs that the homes were substantially completed
during this period. In a large percentage of the cases
they were occupied by the purchasers. (T. 190). Ho·wrever, none of them had been completed to the satisfaction
of the Veterans Administration. At that time, Mr. Wilson E. Taylor, Attorney in charge of surety bond claims
for the Hartford, came to Salt Lake from San Francisco
to determine the status. of the matter, and wl1at could
be done to bring it to a conclusion. (T. 82, 187-198, 251,
265). At that time, it appeared that there was approximately $22,500 undisbursed from the 1nortgage proceeds.
(T. 82, 84, 85, 126, 251, 376). It "\Yas estin1ated by the
Veteran.s Ad1ninistration inspector that the several
homes in the tract could be con1pleted in accordance
with V. A. require1nents at a eost of approximately
$26,500. (T. 190, ~15). Cassady \vas \Yithout funds to
proceed. ( T. 215). All parties \Yere agreed that the funds
remaining undisbursed should be .applied to this purpose, and that every effort should be 1nade to complete
the homes and obtain \T. A. approval. (T. 87, 191, 193,
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264). Felt then indicated that it had made an assignment of its rights under the construction contract to
Wright-Wirthlin, a re.al estate agency. ( T. 85, 86, 193,
221; Ex. H-31). This was vvithout the consent of Cassady.
(T. 238). The realtors were unwilling to subordinate
their rights, and therefore, the funds which Felt would
be entitled to receive under the construction contract,
could not be made available except by going through the
procedure of declaring Felt in default in accordance
with the lo.an agreement. (T. 191, 193, 194-195). It was
contemplated that this procedure would be followed but
nothing in thi.s direction was accomplished by Prudential
Federal until "very late in the game," (August 12, 1952)
when it finally got around to serving notice of default.
(T. 73, 95-97; Ex. Pr-30).

Also, in February of 1952, the matter of ~extra expenses incurred and work performed by Cass.ady was
discussed at a meeting of interested parties. Cassady
presented a long list of extra :expenses for which he had
not been reimbursed. (T. 87, 195-198, 278). No representative of Felt raised any objection to the claimed
extras. Mr. Snyder said merely, that Felt had no funds
with which to pay the same. (T. 198). Mr. Thomas Taylor, of Prudential Federal testified that many of the
items appeared to him to be entirely justifiable. ( T. 87).
Although there is a conflict in the record, as to whether
certain of the claimed items of extra.s should properly
be allowed, there are certain items about which there
appears to be no dispute, among which are the followIng:
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Under the disbursing agreement of August 10, 1950,
(Ex. Pr-8), it was contemplated that the project would
be completed within the 180 days provided in the original
construction contract, and that Associated Accountants,
the bonded disbursing agency, would have to make no
more than 12 to 14 disbursals. (Par. 13, disbursal agreement.) However, the project got bogged do,vn immediately, and in September of 1950, the time for completion was extended. (Ex. Pr-5). Also, because of irregular
inspections made in the initial phases, disbursals had
to be made more frequently than every two weeks, during
the early phases of construction. Because of this fact,
Accountants was required to make many- more than
the 12 to 14 disbursals contemplated in the original
disbursal agreement for ,,~hich it was entitled to extra
compensation. (Par. 13, disbursal agreement). Under the
terms of the disbursal agreement, Cassady- was partially
responsible for Accountant's fees, including the extra
compensation for extra disbursals. Therefore, because
of the delays caused by slo\vness of payn1ents to Cassady, ·extra disbursal periods "Tere required, \Yhich resulted in an extra disbursal expense to Accountants.
Although Accountants originally clanned a n1uch larger
fee, it was finally settled by Cassady for a figure between $4:,000 and $5,000. ( T. 197.. :260). X o other party
to this litigation has questioned this as a legiti1nate eA'ira.
It is undisputed, that there \Yere son1e reYisions
in the house plans, and that n1ore of the more expensive
and less of the less expensive type of ho1nes \Yere to be
built. ( T. 2±~, ~-t~). The nu1nber of the different floor
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23
plans and elevations to be built was not definitely established until September 27, 1950, more than t\vo months
after commencement of the project. (Ex. H-32). Thus,
Cassady had not only the additional expense of additional units of the more expensive type, but actually
two months delay in getting final instruction.s as to the
number of ·each type of unit to be constructed. Here
was another item of extra expense incurred by Cassady,
undisputed by any other party, for which he was never
reimbursed. ( T. 242).
Cassady sustained a substantial loss of buying
power due to lack of payments as per contract. This
was estimated by him as over $17,500. It resulted in
two ways. Contractors with whom he had contracts were
not paid on schedule. Due to the Korean War, ,and a
shortage of materials, they refused to complete their contracts, since they were not being paid for the materials
which they had furnished and they could get a better
price for them elsewhere. It thus become necessary to
buy the materials on the open market, at a higher price,
stimulated by the Korean War. Secondly, it was impos·sible to take advantage of cash di.scounts, which were
available upon prompt payment for materials bought
in large quantities. (T. 244.) (See also letters in Exs.
H-32, H-33.)
Cassady also found it necessary to borrow money
from Peter Shelby in the approximate amount of $30,000.
This ,again was due to the failure of Felt to make payments timely. (T. 245). This is another item of extra
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expense which is undisputed in the record and for which
Cassady was neve·r reimbursed.
In August, 1952, the obligees served notice of default on Cassady and the Hartford. (Ex. Pr-30). In
response thereto, the Hartford, through Wilson Taylor,
by letter addre_ssed to Prudential Feder.al's attorney,
advised that since Felt Syndinate had not lived up to
its contractural obligations, and "as the rights of Prudential Federal Savings & Loan Association under the
bond . . . are contingent upon Felt . . . fulfilling all its
obligations" the Hartford would have no obligation to
comply with the demands of the letter. (Ex. H-29). Prudential Federal responded to this letter, but made no
dissent to the interpretation placed upon the bond by
the Hartford. (Ex. H-28, T. 206).
Later that month, and pursuant to arrangements
previously made, Prudential Federal's attorney visited
Wilson Taylor in S.an Francisco to discuss this matter.
( T. 201). Mr. Taylor expressed the ·vie"\Y that "the rights
of Prudential [Federal] under the bond ".,.ere contingent upon Felt and the title company both fulfilling their
·contracts with Cassady." (T. 204). Prudential Federal's
.attorney concurred saying, •'you are probably right."
(T. 205, 219).
On October 8, 1952, the \'eterans AdJ.ninistration
fin:ally rejeeted each ru1d all of the 100 ho1nes, and gave
final refusal to approve any of then1 for G. I. loans.
(T. 11, 12, 17, 41, 53, 104, 110, 142, 154).
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In April of 1953, Welch Planning Mill filed an action against Prudential Federal and Felt and the various
100 home owners, to recover monies due it for furnishing materials to the job, .and to foreclose its materialman's lien claims against the project. Subsequently other
lien claimants intervened, and eventually claims in the
total sum of approximately $30,000 were filed. The Hartford vvas also interpleaded as a third party defendant.
That litigation was eventually terminated in October
of 1955 by a compromise settlement whereby Prudential
Federal and the Hartford each contributed $10,000 in
full satisfaction of all claims of materialmen, and also
all ·claims of the home owners for defective workmanship, etc. There was never an adjudication as to the
merits of any of these claims, and none of the defendants in the prior litigation ever .admitted legal liability
to any of the plaintiffs or cross-claimants. (Tit. Co. R.
2, 7' 12, 19) .
Within the six month period allowed by the bond,
each of the three plaintiffs filed their respective suits
against the Hartford to recover on the bond. (Tit. Co.
R. 1; Prud. Fed. R. 1; Felt, R. 1). The suits were duly
consolidated for trial before the Hon. A. H. Ellett. Two
pretrials were held (T. 1-16, 17-21), after which the
cases c;ame regularly on for trial in Dece·mber of 1956.
(T. 22). Evidence was taken for a period of three days,
after which tim~, further evidence, by way of depositions,
was taken in Los Angeles. (Exs. 39, 40, 41). The cases
were finally argued in March of 1957, after which the
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tiffs and against the defendant. (T. 424; Tit. Co. R. 22;
Prud. Fed. R. 41-42; Felt R. 45-47). Motions to amend
the findings of fact and conclu_sions of law and to set
aside the judgments or in the alternative for a new trial
were duly made by the Hartford in each of the three
cases. (Tit. Co. R. 14-15; Prud-Fed. R. 43-47; Felt R.
48-50). Some minor modifications vrere made in the findings of fact and conclusions of la\v in the Prudential
Federal case, and the amount of the judgment was reduced. (Prud. Fed. R. 48, 49, 50). Otherwise the findings,
conclusions and judgment~ were not disturbed. (Tit. Co.
R. 16; Prud. Fed. R. 48; Felt R. 51).
At the outset of the l\Iorningside Heights Building
program Felt, a Nevada corporation was duly qualified
to do business in Utah, having qualified on :Jlarch 28,
1950. However, prior to the litigation in\olnng the lien
claimants, on September 2, 1952, its franchise 1\:--as forfeited for non-payment of taxes. It \Yas reinstated on
January 7, 195±, but its franchise \Yas again forfeited
on March 21, 1956, during the progress of the instant
litigation, and \Yas never reinstated. ( T. 135, 138, 139,
278-9; Ex. H-23).
The an1ount of dan1ages a\Yarded to the plaintiffs
Prudential Federal and Felt is not in issue in this appeal,
and we therefore do not detail the basis on vrhich danlage,s to those t'vo plaintiffs '""ere determined.
The only loss of any kind sustained by the Title
Cornpany 'vas the expense incurred by it in defending
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the original lien claim suit on behalf of Prudential Federal. ( T. 173). This included both court costs and attorney fees. Under the terms of its policy it w.as obligated to defend Prudential Federal's title. (T. 173).
This was true regardless of whether there was any merit
to the lien claims. ( T. 173). Had the clain1s been wholly
groundless the title company would still have had the
obligation of defending them. It, however, contributed
nothing toward the settlement of the lien claims. Its loss
resulted wholly from its contractual obligations to Prudential Federal, and not to any default on the part of
the Hartford's principal. (Tit. Co. R. 12-13, T. 173).
In summary, Cassady contracted to supervise, coordinate and procure the construction of one hundred
homes for Felt in accordance with V. A. requirem,ents.
The H.artford executed a performance bond. Prudential
Federal agreed to loan the necessary monies upon the
performance of certain conditions precedent. Felt failed
to make progress payments to Cassady in accordance
with its contractual agreement, and otherwise breached
its contract. As a result Cassady was unable to complete
the one hundred homes in accordance with V. A. requirements. Prudential Federal did nothing to protect
its own interest and permitted the project to "go to
pot" when it had the means to s.ave it and prevent substantial loss. The Hartford's bond specifically exonerated it from liability to all obligees in the event of br,each
on the part of either or any of them. The Hartford therefore contends that the judgments below should be reversed.
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POINTS TO BE ARGUED
POINT I.
THE COURT MADE FINDINGS OF FACT IN ALL
THREE CASES WHOLLY UNSUPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THEREFORE ·CONTRARY TO LAW.
POINT II.
FELT WAS GUILTY OF SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL BREACHES OF ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS
TO 'THE HARTFORD'S PRINCIPAL, WHICH BREA:CHES
CONTRIBU·TED TO •CAUSE THE ULTIMATE LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO THIS LITIGATION.
POINT III.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS GUILTY OF SUBSTANTIAL AND MA'TERIAL BREACHES OF ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, AND FAILED TO TAKE STEPS TO
PREVEN·T OR MINIMIZE THE DAMAGES, WHICH CONTRIBU'TED TO CAUSE 'THE ULTIMATE LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO THIS LITIGATION.
POINT IV.
THE COURT DREW ERRONEOUS ·CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, BASED UPON FACTS UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AND CONTRARY TO F ...~MILIAR PRINCIPLES OF
LAW.
POINT V.
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE BOND, A
BREACH UPON THE PART OF ANY OF THE OBLIGEES,
WOULD DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF ALL, AND THEREFOR.E THE BREACHES ON THE PART OF BOTH FELT
AND PRUDEN'TIAL DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF ALL OBLIGEES.
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'POIN'T VI.
FELT BEING A NON-RESIDEN'T CORPORA'TION AND
HAVING FORFEITED ITS 1CORPOR~TE FRANCHISE TO
DO BUSINESS IN THIS STATE, HAS NO STANDING TO
MAINTAIN ITS ACTION IN THE UTAH COURTS.
POINT VII.
THE 'TITLE COMPANY DID NOT SUSTAIN ANY COMPENSABLE DAMAGE, AND THEREFORE IS NO'T ENTITLED 'TO RECOVER ANYTHING FROM THE HARTFORD.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT MADE FINDINGS OF F AC'T IN ALL
THREE CASES WHOLLY UNSUPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE, AND THEREFORE ·CONTRARY TO LAW.

In its motion to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of L.aw in each of the three cases before the
court, the Hartford point~ed out specifically and in detail, wherein the court made Findings of Fact wholly
unsupported by the evidence, or contrary to the great
weight of the evidence. (Tit. Co. R. 14-15; Prud. Fed.
R. 43-47; Felt R. 48-50). We refer to those motions for
a detailed statement as to errors thus made. It is not
ne-cessary to repeat all of that here. Some of the Findings which we attacked were of little or no significance.
Some of the Findings in the Prudential Federal case
were substantially modified by the court. However, so
that there may be no supposition by the Court, that we
tacitly acquiesce in any of the Court's Findings which
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we have heretofore attacked, and which have not subsequently been amended or stricken, we wish to state here,
that we do not waive any such defects nor do we acquie.sce
in them. In general, they will be discussed in connection
with other points in this brief. A few of them are of
such major importance that we believe that our exceptions to them should at least be noted here although
they will be discussed in greater detail under later points.
(a) Finding No. 4 in the Prudential Federal Case
to the effect that Felt was "at all time.s material" to
the cas·e, qualified to carry on business in the State of
Utah, and Finding No. 1 in the Felt case, to the same
general effect, are wholly contrary to the evidence.
The status of Felt was stipulated by its attorneys and
by the Hartford's attorney and further demonstrated
by a certificate from the Secretar~~ of State of Utah
showing it not to be in good standing at the time of trial.
There is no evidence to the contrary-. The importance
of this will be demonstrated under Point \---I.
(b) By the last sentence of Finding X o. 27 in the
Prudential Federal ·case, the court finds there is no
evidence that Prudential Federal~s failure to eollect lien
waivers fron1 Accountants resulted in any drunage or
prejudice to the flartford or Cassady. The record shows
without dispute that lien elai1ns in exeess of $30,000
were asserted and filed by y,arious laborers~ sucontractors and 1nateriahnen; that Prudential Federal "~as unable to defeat ~neh elain1s by producing lien "\Yaivers,
and that by reason thereof, such clailns "'"ere eventually
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compromised .and settled by the payment by both Prudential Federal and the Hartford of the sum of $10,000
each, to the lien claimants. We believe that a $10,000
loss must be regarded as substantial prejudice.
(c) By Finding No. 29 in the Prudential Federal
case and Finding No. 18 in the Felt Case, the court
.apparently determined that Cassady should not have
commenced work until all of the mortgages had been
executed and re·corded. This would have meant that work
would not have been commenced until December of 1950.
(T. 38, 62, 106). I-Iowever, the evidence shows that some·
of the Veteran purcha.sers became dissatisfied at the
slow rate of progress of the project, and cancelled their
loan .agreements. (T. 39, 62). This made it necessary
to locate and sell to a new Veteran purchaser-borrower.
(T. 39, 62, 323). Certainly if Cassady had not started
work until December of 1950, there would have been
more cancellations, and the program would have been
further delayed. Moreover, under the construction contr.act, (Ex. Pr-2, Par. 26), Cassady was obligated to
commence construction work within ten days, and to
complete the homes within 180 days. Under paragraph
23 of the same agreement, Felt was obligated to make
disbursements to Cassady according to the "actual stage
of ·completion" of the work. There is no provision or
li1nitation in the construction contr.act or the disbursal
contract, that payments shall depend upon Felt's sales
program, or upon mortgage monies being made available.
The agreem·ent to pay is unqualified, unconditional and
unambiguous. There c.an be no doubt that in order to
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get the job done within the time stipulated by the contract Cassady had to rely upon Felt's promise to pay
according to the actual stage of completion. The evidence shows without dispute, that in order for the
work to have been accomplished within the time contemplated by the contract, that it was neces.sary that it be
promptly commenced and prosecuted in an orderly fashion .It could not have been done by skipping about the
subdivision doing a home here and a home there as the
homes were sold. The entire success of the project depended upon mass production methods, and this involved
proceeding with the project as a unit. The only way
that Cassady could hope to comply with his contractual
obligation was to build accordingly, and to rely upon
Felt to make the course of construction payments, as
they became due. The failure of Felt to make payments
in accordance ''Tith its contractual obligations, \Yas the
real c.ause of the ultimate failure of the project.
(d) Finding No. 39 in the Prudential Federal ease,
which is like Finding No. 20 in the Felt case~ and Finding
No. 18 in the Title Con1pany case, is crucial to all three
of these cases. In the faee of a reeord replete 'Yith evidenee of breach after breaeh on the part of Felt, to
whirh there is no dissent or dispute, and eorroborated
by practically ever~T 'Yitness 'Yho took the stand, the
court finds that Felt did not breach its contractual
obligations to ('1n88ady or to the Hartford in any substantial 1nanner. These breaches "ill be discussed in
fioJne detail under our Point II. infr.a. ,,. . e 1nerely note
at this thne that the reeord was without dispute; that
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there were repeated and continuous breaches on the part
of Felt in failing to make course of construction payments in accordance with the construction contract; that
there was failure to provide .a power connection in the
inception of the work; that Felt did not pay Cassady
for extra work and materials furnished by him, and that
Felt without the written consent of Cassady, assigned
its rights under the construction contract.
(e) By Finding No. 11 in the Felt case the court
finds that .at no time did the structures meet the requirements of the Veterans Administration. This is in direct
conflict with the undisputed evidence, including that offered by Felt itself, that in the initial phase.s of construction, the workmanship was entirely satisfactory,
and not until a financial breakdown had occurred, without fault on the p.art of Cassady, did the inspectors
start noting deficiencies.
(f) \Ve also note here our dissent to the court's
finding No. 17 in the Title Company case, and No. 38
in the Prudential Federal case to the effect that Prudential Federal did not breach its contractual obligations. This will be more fully discussed under our Point

III.
POINT II.
FELT WAS GUIUTY OF SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL BREACHES OF ITS CONTRACTUAL O·BLIGATIONS
TO 'THE HARTFORD'S PRINCIPAL, WHICH BREACHES
CONTRIBU'TED 'TO ·CAUSE 'THE ULTIMATE LOSSES SUSTAINED BY 'T'HE VARIOUS PARTIES TO 'THIS LITIGATION.
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It is elementary that an obligee would have no
right to recover on the bond of a contractor, if it had
itself breached the bond or the contract on which it was
written, in any material respect. 10 Appleman, Insurance
Law and Practice, page 50. That rule must apply with
even greater force here, where Felt and Cassady are
really co-adventurers. Under the terms of the construction agreement Cassady agreed to do certain things in
connection with the building program. Felt 1vas responsible for other matters such as off-site improvements,
water connections, etc. If the project was successful they
were to share in the profits. Each had an interest in seeing the project successfully completed. l~nder the.se circumstances Felt should not be permitted to recover from
Cassady's surety, for reasons "~hich ''ere forcefully and
effectively stated by Judge Kennedy in the case of U.S.
vs. U. S. F & G. Co. (D.C. \'{yo.) 4 F. Supp. 85-±, 855 as
follows:
1

•

"It seems quite evident that the rule of law
should be that a joint adventurer [Felt] under
these circumstances should not be permitted to
recover upon a bond giYen to guarantee the fulfillnlent of the contract of his co-adYenturer [CassadY]. The duties of the contractor [Cassady]
to fulfill the proYisions of his contract are
no 1nore iinperatiYe than those of one "'\Yho is
jointly interested \Yith hin1 in its success. The
obligations are the sa1ne, to \Yit, to see that the
con traet is fulfilled in eYe ry particular before
a surety should be eon1pelled to ans\\Ter for the
default. As a n1ntter of fact, the principal contractor [Cassady] n1ight .as "Tell be entitled to
recover for his O\\Tn default against his O\Yn surety
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[Hartford] as to permit one jointly interested
with him in its success [Felt] to do so. Such a
rule of law would open the door to fraud of a
serious type. ~c·ounsel have assured us that the
books have been searched in v.ain for a judicial
precedent and the court itself has verified their
conclusion. Perhaps the lack of precedent arises
from the fact that one has never before attempted
to enforce his claim upon the bond of the principal contractor who was his joint adventurer."
That language was quoted with approval in Theabald-Jansen Elec. Co. vs. P. H. Meyer) et al., 77 F. (2d)
27.
We have noted that Felt was guilty of substantial
breaches in four important p.articulars. We herewith
discuss them in some detail.
A. FELT FAILED TO MAKE PAYMENTS TO CASSADY SUBS'TANTIALLY IN ACCORDAN,CE WITH
THE PROVISIONS OF 'THE CONSTRUCTION CON'TRACT.
1

This fact was recognized by nearly every witness
called to testify in this case. Thomas Taylor, president
and general manager of Prudential Federal, testified
that there were insufficient funds to rn.ake payments to
subcontractors, and that the proje·ct "was thirsting for
necessary money," (T. 64); and " . . . the project was
bogging down due to lack of money," ( T. 65) ; and there
was considerable difficulty ,all through the fall keeping
payments to Cassady up with the work. (T. 67).
Cassady testified that the first progress p.ayment
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tinued in existence throughout the course of the project, even after the execution of the supplemental agreement of February 1951. Mr. Cassady's testimony is
illuminated by letters of complaint received from various
subcontractors and materialmen which were received in
evidence, and show the dissatisfaction that was developing. (T. 268, 275; Exs. H-32, H-33). Felt recognized that
payments were in default, and that the project was imperiled. In a series of letters to Prudential Federal,
Felt repeatedly called attention to the fact that payments
were behind construction, and urged that everything
possible be done to expedite recording of mortgages and
bring progress payments up to date. (Exs. H-13, H-14).
In an undated letter, obviously written in the late summer or fall of 1950 to Prudential Federal, Felt, over
the signature of Scott, recognized that the "situation in
Morningside Heights could become grat~e." (Ex. H-15)
(Emphasis ours).
Felt's ''"·itness ~Iulcock, also testified that an orderly
flow of funds into the project "~as necessary: that the
problem """as n1ade n1ore acute by reason of the Kore.an
War; that lark of available cash prevented the contractor
from obtaining rash discounts, etc. (T. 158). He further
testified that """ork progressed n1ore rapidly at the start
than later. ( T. 155, 15·7). _A_ srunple l1o1ne, picked at
rando1n hy the "·itness. lot 203, passed its first t"""O inspections satisfactorily. (T. 145, 155). Deficiencies were
not noted until 1\fa.y of 1951 on the third inspection. (T.
144-14-fl, 155, 156). This \vas typical of the situation with
respeet to ot ht'r units. (Ex. F-~4). In other words the
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project started out satisf.actorily, but the deficiencies
in necessary monie.s inevitably led to a break-down,
resulting in deficiencies of workmanship and materials.
(T. 157, 158). The witness Scott also recognized that
the absence of an orderly flow of mortgage funds into
the project would inevitably defeat its success. (T. 157,
158). There is no evidence in the record to the contrary.
In the face of such a record, we do not understand
how the court could find that Felt did not breach any
material obligations. It must be borne in mind that Felt
had an obligation to Cassady to pay according to the
course of construction, .and that said obligation was not
qu.alified as to recording mortgages, sales program or
any other r~Lanner. It mu.st also be borne in mind that the
bond specifically provided the "surety shall not be liable
under the bond ... unless the Obligees ... shall make
payment to the principal in reasonable compliance with
the terms of said contract as to payments . . . " This
breach alone is sufficient to defeat the rights of all the
plaintiffs to recover in their three separate actions. As
was so well s.aid by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of People of Puerto Rico vs. Title
Guaranty Co., 227 U.S. 382, 335 S. Ct. 362:
"If within the time allow~d for performance
the plaintiff made performance impossible, it is
unimaginable that any civilized system of law
would allow it to re·cover upon the bond for a
f.ailure to perform."
B. WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CASSADY, FELT ASSIGNED ITS RIGHTS UNDER 'THE CONSTRUCTION
CONTRACT TO WRIGHT-WIRTHLIN, A FIRM O·F
REAL E8TATE AGENTS.
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The next item of breach, which is establi.shed with-out contradiction in the record, is that Felt, without the
consent of Cassady assigned a portion of its rights under
the contract directly to Wright-Wirthlin, a firm of real
estate salesmen. (Ex. H-31). This led to serious difficulties at the time the partie.s were attempting to wind
up the project, as is shown by the undisputed testimony
of Wilson Taylor, and corrobated in part by Thon1as
Taylor and other witnesses. There was available in February, 1952, approximately $22,500 of mortgage funds.
(T. 82, 85, 189). This would have been practically sufficient to complete the project in accordance with \T. A.
requirements. All of the interested partie.s were willing
that said funds be so used. Ho,y·ever, because of the fact
that Felt had 1nade an assignment to \\-.-right-\rirthlin
of monies 'vhich it would otherwise have been entitled
to receive, it 'vas impossible to apply these funds to
the completion of the project. (T. 188-195).
C. FEL'T NEGLECTED TO PROVIDE A POWER CONNECTION TO CASSADY, AS A RESULT OF WHICH
HE WAS PUT TO THE EXPENSE OF HIRING AN
ELE·CTRIC GENERATOR AT A COST IN EXCESS
OF $2,000.

The record sho\\~s 'Yithout dispute, and even Felf:S
witnesses adn1itted, that there "~as a failure to furnish
a power eonneetion ns required by the eonstruetion contract. This oeenrred at the ineeption of the project ,,~hen
1noney 'vn8 particularly scarce~ as a result of 'Yhich
Ca~sady llPeP8Sarily ineurred expenses in an aDlOUnt in
excess of $2,000 to provide a power generator at a tiine
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when funds vvere dearly needed and should have been
available for the payment of materialmen and subcontractors.
D. CASSADY PERF'ORMED EX'TRA LABOR A N D
FURNISHED EXTRA MATERIAL, NOT CONTEMPLA'TED BY THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT, FOR
WHICH HE WAS NEVER PAID OR REIMBURSED
BY F·E:LT.

In our statement of facts herein, we detailed at
some length items of extra expense incurred by ~cass.ady
wholly undisputed by Felt or any other party to this
litigation. There is no need to repeat the details of those
extra expenditures here. In the aggregate those which
are undisputed went into many thousands of dollars. It
is significant that no officer of Felt was called to testify
on its behalf, or to dispute the items of extra claimed
by Cassady. The only witness called at all by Felt was
Scott, whose connection with Felt terminated in the
late winter or spring of 1951, who had no knowledge of
what transpired after that time in connection with the
project, and who did not participate in any way in the
meetings where the m.atter of extra expenses vvas discussed. This failure on the part of Felt to rebut the
evidence amounts to a tacit admission of its veracity.
In summary, the record shows without dispute that
Felt never made payment to Cassady in acordance with
the actual stage of construction, i.e., in accordance with
its contractual .agreement; that this failure imrnediately
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ation, loss of efficiency, loss of buying power, and complete disintegration of effective organization; that Felt
failed to reimburse Cassady for · items of extra work
and expense to the further prejudice of the work; that
Felt failed to provide a required power connection to
the further detriment of Cassady; and that Felt, without the consent of Cassady, and in violation of its contractual obligations, assigned a portion of its rights
under it.s contract with Cassady, and that such assignment was a substantial impediment contributing to the
ultimate failure to complete the ·construction in accordance with \T. A. requirements.
POINT III.
PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL WAS GUILTY OF SUBSTANTIAL AND MATERIAL BREACHES OF ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS, AND FAILED TO TAKE STEPS TO
PREVENT OR MINIMIZE THE DAMAGES, WHICH CONTRIBUTED TO CAUSE THE ULTIMATE LOSSES SUSTAINED BY THE VARIOUS PARTIES TO THIS LITIGATION.
A. PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL FAILED TO OBTAIN LIEN
WAIVERS FROM ACCOUNTANTS CON·TRARY TO
ITS OBLIGATIONS BOTH UNDER THE LOAN
AGREEMENT AND THE DISBURSING AGREEMENT.
\\\) haY() ah·ead~~

I hereof, and

\\~r·

discussed this 1natter under Point
enn add nothing to it at this point.

B. PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL NEGLECTED TO HOLD
UP PAYMEN'TS OR TO TAKE ANY OTHER ACTION
TO REQUIRE THAT DEFECTIVE WORK ON THE
PART OF CASSADY BE CORRECTED.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
Under both the loan agreement and the supplemental
agreement Prudential Federal had the right to withhold
the disbursement of any funds until Cassady's work had
been approved by the V.A. inspector. Prudential Federal
regularly received reports of the V.A. inspector, and it
also had its own inspector on the job. It therefore was
fully apprised as to any deficiencies in workmanship.
Notwithstanding this fact, it did absolutely nothing to
require or compel Cassady to bring his work into line
with V.A. requirements. We anticipate that Prudential
Federal's attorneys will contend that the contractual
provi.sions above referred to, were optional or elective
with Pru~ential Federal, and not mandatory. That may
well be true, in the sense that Prudential Federal would
not be liable in damages to other parties for failure to
take the action authorized by contract. It did, however,
apart from any contractual obligation, have a common
law duty to mitigate its own damages. Had it held up
payments to Cassady as soon as deficiencies in workmanship were noted, the errors could have been readily corrected, instead of being compounded. Cassady would
either have been required to correct the deficiencies or a
new contractor would have been engaged to complete the
work. While this might not have completely eliminated
the loss, it would have substantially mitigated it. It does
not appear that Prudential Federal even took the trouble
to obtain bids from other contractors for completing the
work when it became apparent that Cassady could not
or would not complete in accordance with V.A. requirements. Instead, it sat supinely by, disbursing funds until
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the mortgage proceeds were exhausted, apparently heedless of the consequences, and content to let the project
"go to p·ot" and to salvage its profit from the assets of
the bonding company.
·C. PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL FAILED TO TAKE OVER
THE COMPLETION OF THE PROJECT, AS IT HAD
THE CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO DO.

This sub-point is very closely allied with the one
immediately preceding. 1Tnder both the loan agreement
and the supplemental agreement, Prudential Federal had
the right, upon the failure to complete the construction
within the time provided by said contracts, to take over
the project and complete the construction using the mortgage loan funds for that purpose. Thus, any time after
June 1, 1951, Prudential Federal could ha\e taken over
and con1pleted the project. ~\s late as February 1952, the
project could haYe been completed in accordance with
\r.A. require1nents, according to the undisputed evidence
for about $26,500. There \Vas then available in undisbursed 1nortgage funds approxin1ately $:2:2,500, so even at
that late date, the project could haYe been con1pleted for
a loss of approxiJ.nately $4,000. Still Prudential Federal
was un\Yilling to take any action. and not until..._\.ugust of
1952 did it even take the trouble to declare a default.
If it~ failure in thi~ regard "~as not a breach of any affirlllatiYP eontraetual obligation, it \\~as at least a breach
o I' its eouunon In'" duty to nlitigate its drunages, and it
should not no\\· be per1nitted to recoYer fro1n the bonding
e<nnpany those profit~ \Yhieh it ney~·r needed to have lost,
had it but taken a f~·",. shnple steps in its o'vn interest.
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POIN·T IV.
THE COURT DREW ERRONEOUS CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW, BASED UPON FACTS UNSUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, AND CON'TRARY TO FAMILIAR PRINCIPLES OF
LAW.
POINT V.
UNDER THE PLAIN LANGUAGE OF THE BOND, A
BREACH UPON THE PART OF ANY OF 'THE OBLIGEES,
WOULD DEFEAT THE RIGHTS OF ALL, AND THEREFORE ~THE BREACHES ON THE PART OF BOTH FELT
AND PRUDEN·TIAL DEFEAT THE RIGHT'S OF ALL OBLIGEES.

Points I\T and \T involve essentially the same questions, and n1ay be discussed together. Both involve the
correct interpretation of two important provisions of the
bond. It is and always has been the contention of the
Hartford, that a breach upon the part of any of the
obligees, would operate to exonerate the surety of and
from any and all liability to either or any of the obligees.
In making this contention \Ve rely upon five separate
grounds as set forth below.
A. THE PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF
THE BOND MAKES IT CLEAR THAT A BREACH
UPON THE PART OF ANY OF THE OBLIGEES RELEASES 'THE SURETY AS TO ALL OF THEM.

The clear language of the bond itself, indicates that
the protection afforded by the bond is subject to performance, by each .and all of the obligees. The last whereas
clause of the bond contains the following language :
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"Said protection to be subject to the performance by the LENDER OBLIGEE, the TITLE
OBLIGEE and the OWNER OBLIGEE of their
respective obligations to the PRINCIPAL in connection with said contract; ***" (Emphasis ours.)
Condition 3 of the bond provides as follows:
"The SURETY shall not be liable unde-r this
Bond to the Obligees, and either of them, WJtless
the Obligees, or either of them, shall rttake payrnents to the PRINCIPAL in reasonable compliance with the terms of said contract as to payments, and each shall perform all other obligations to be performed by each obligee under said
contract at the time and in the manner therein set
forth." (Emphasis ours.)

vVe

do not see that an~ meaning, other than that
ascribed by the surety to the foregoing language can be
given to it. Effect and n1eaning must be given to all of
the language used in the bond. It is an elementaTy principle of contract la"~, that a part~ who breaches an agreeInent, is not entitled to look to the other party for damages. "An obligee would have no right to recover on the
bond of a contractor, if it had itself breached the bond
in any 1naterial respect.~~ 10 . .-\.ppleman, Insurance Law
& Practice, p. 51. Therefore~ there "~ould have been no
pojnt whatsoever in e1nploying the foregoing language if
the 1>arties had 1neant nothing n1ore than that a breach
by
one obli<ree
'vould IuerelY
bar that oblio-ee
from re.,
t"'t
•
0
eovery. OhYiously the parties intended son1e thing more
than this, and tht:•y u,sed language ""hich to us seen1s perfectly clear. Condition 3 recites that the usurety shall
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not be liable" unless each shall perform all of the obligations to be performed by each obligee under the contract
at the time and in the rnanner therein set forth. It is
difficult to conceive what language the parties might
have used to express more clearly their intent. Nor can
any other meaning be reasonably ascribed to the aforesaid language.
B. THE CIRCUM8TAN·CES OF THE PARTIES AT THE
TIME THE BOND WAS WRIT'TEN, MAKE IT CLEAR
THAT IT MUST HAVE BEEN THE INTENTION OF
THE PARTIES THAT THE SURETY WOULD NOT
BE LIABLE UNLESS EACH OF THE OBLIGEES
PERFORMED ITS OBLIGATION.

While vve do not believe that the language of the
bond is ambiguous, if any ambiguity exists a resort to
extrinsic evidence will certainly clarify the same.
Let us look to the circumstances of the parties at the
time the bond was signed, in the light of which the bond
must be construed. 9 Appleman, Insurance La-\v and
Practice, p. 68; Continental Bank v. Stewart, 4 Ut. (2d)
228, 291 Pac. (2d) 890. The evidence shows without dispute that Cassady's financial statement was unsatisfactory, and that he was having considerable difficulty
in obtaining a bond. Felt was so uncertain as to Cassady's financial position, that it was seriously considering
the employment of .another contractor to take on this
work. Negotiations to obtain a bond in Salt Lake City
were completely without avail, and the bond was finally
written in Los Angeles with the financial backing of a
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struction which Prudential Federal and the Title Company would have the court place on the bond, would make
the bonding company a surety not only for 'Cassady, but
also for Felt. In view of Cassady's precarious financial
position, it must have been apparent to all concerned,
that this project could succeed only if Cassady received
progress payments timely, and had an orderly flow of
mortgage funds into the project to keep payments to
materialmen and suppliers up to date. It is inconceivable
that in light of this background, the bonding company
would have undertaken to guarantee performance on the
part of Cassady without insisting that every party to the
obligation fully perform its contract. To construe otherwise, would permit Felt to deliberately shipwreck the
project and then throw the entire loss on the bonding
company.
C. THE LAN·GUAGE OF THE BOND WAS NOT DRAFTED BY REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SURETY COMPANY, BU'T RATHER BY REPRESENTATIVES OF
'T'HE OBLIGEES, AND PARTICULARLY PRUDEN'TIAL FEDERAL, AND THEREFORE ANY AMBIGUITIES IN THE LANGUAGE OF THE BOND
SHOULD BE CONSTRUED MOST S T R 0 N G L Y
AGAINST THE 0 B L I GEES RATHER THAN
AGAINST THE SURETY.

While 've recognize that ordinarily an1biguous language of a bond \Yill be construed 1nost strongly against
a surety con1pany, tha:t rule should have no application
in this case. The rule found its origin in the general principle that in construing contract docun1ents, ambiguous
language \Yill be construed 1nost strongly against the
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party who employed it. However, that reason is wholly
non-existent in the case at bar. This bond was not on
a printed forn1, carefully drawn and prepared by a battery of legal experts for the surety, as is frequently the
c.ase. On the contrary, the language is not that of the
surety at all. The stipulations and admissions of Prudential Federal's attorney, and the undisputed testimony of C. P. Cassady, Deco \Tan Horn, and Mr. Blackburn, establish beyond question, that the bond form
suggested by the Hartford w.as wholly rejected, and the
bond was finally written in accordance with a form prepared by repre.sentatives of Prudential Federal. The
language of the bond on which the Hartford relies, is
language drafted by Prudential Feder.al's attorney.
This comes within the provision of the Restatement
of Contracts, Sec. 236 (d) :
\

"Where words or other manifestations of intention bear more than one reasonable meaning an
interpretation is preferred which operates more
strongly ag.ainst the party from whom they proceed, unles.s their use by him is prescribed by law."
D. THE OBLIGEES THEMSELVES, AND PARTICULARLY PRUDENTIAL FEDERAL, INTERPRETED
THE BOND, ·THE SAME AS THE SURETY INTERPRETED THE BOND, AND ALL PARTIES INTER-PRETED IT, AS THE ~SURETY NOW IN·TERPRETS
IT.

The construction adopted by the bonding company
was set forth by the surety's attorney, l\fr. Wilson E.
Taylor in a letter as early as September, 1952, addressed
to Prudential Federal's attorney, to which no dissent
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was made. The undisputed te.stimony of Mr. Wilson E.
Taylor shows that Prudential Federal's attorney concurred in this interpretation in an oral conference at San
Francisco in September of 1952. The acts of the parties,
and the interpretation which they placed on the language
of the bond, is good evidence of the intention of the parties.
E. UNDER WELL ESTABLISHED LAW, THIS COURT
CANNOT REFUSE TO GIVE EFFECT TO THE
PLAIN MEANING AND INTENT OF THE LANGUAGE USED BY 'THE PARTIES, AND AS THE
SURETY HAS LIMITED ITS LIABILITY IN APT
TERMS, THE COURT CANNOT UNDER ·THE GUISE
OF CONSTRUING THE CONTRACT, ~CREATE A
GREATER LIABILITY THAN THE SURETY CONTRACTED.

It is not for the court to ascribe to the language of
the parties .a meaning never intended by them.
In th~e early case of Smith v. Bowman, (Ut.), 88 Pac.
687, this court _said:

"In deter1nining the true intention of the parties to the bond in question, we must look not to
disconnected sentences, or only a portion of a
sentence, taken from the context, but we must
look at the bond as a \vhole, and consider it in connection with the contract attached to it and for the
security of which it was given. *** The parties
to the bond had the undoubted right to contract
as to who should and who should not be benefited
by its obligations. ***

"*** The parties having thus expressed themselves unambiguously, we can see no reason \vhy
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ing their obvious purpose in an endeavor to read
some one into the bond not intended to be benefited by it. *** These cases but illustrate the
principle that the liability of a surety on his bond
is entirely dependent upon his: covenants :and
agreements so construed as not to extend the
liability by implication beyond the terms of his
contract. ***'' (Emphasis ours.)
The rule there laid down, has been invariably followed since that time. In Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free, (Ut.),
148 Pac. 427, this court, speaking through Justice Frick,
said:
"It certainly cannot be questioned that appellant, like all other persons, had a right to limit
and define the precise obligations it was willing
to and did assume, regardless of the terms of the
contract. ***'' (Emphasis ours.)
And further :
"This being so, we have no right to ext,end
the scope and effect of the bond beyond what the
parties thereto, from the language used by them,
must have intended it should have. Nor are we
permitted to have recourse to only a few general
expressions in order to dete~rmine the intention
of the parties. In order to arrive at the true intention of the parties, .all that is said in the bond
must be considered and where the bond contains
express restrictions and limitations, as is the case
here, the courts have no right to look to other instruments for the purpose of extending the scope
and effect of the bond. *** When we come to lay
down the rules of construction, however, and give
scope and effect to the language used by the parties in written contracts or documents, all parties
h.ave the right to insist that we shall be careful
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in not extending the scope and effect of their
language beyond what they intended it to have,
and to that end they have a right to insist that
court~ be bound by the usual ordinary rules of
construction. The que1stion here is, not whether
under the circumstances, it would not be more just
to permit respondent to recover on the bond; but
the question is whether it was the intention of the
pHrties to the bond that it should have the right
to do so. ***" (Emphasis our:s.)
And further :

"Where limitations and restrictions are placed
in a BOND IN EXPRESS TERMS, it requires
no argument to prove that rights in conflict with
or in derogation of such limitations and restrictions may not be inferred and enforced. To do so
would be to violate every canon of interpretation."
(Emphasi.s ours.)
In a concurring opinion Chief J ustiee Straup said:
"I concur. In determining the meaning of a
written contract, the primary factor is to ascertain
the intention of the parties. That largely is to be
ascertained from the language en1ployed by them.
As to sureties, their liability is not to be extended
by implication beyond the ternzs of their contract.
They have the right to stand strictly on the express terms of it a1~d to insist that they be uot
held responsible for any liability or obligation not
directly expressed U'it hin it. ,~Vhen on such consideration the intention of the parties as so expressed is once ascertained~ then the contract 'vith
such ascertained intention is given effect and applied, not liberally or strictly, nor generously or
niggardly, but truly eon1pletely~ and confor1nably
with such ascertained intent of the parties." (Emphasis ours.)
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In W. H. Walker Realty Co. v. A1nerican SuretJl
Co. of N.Y., (Ut.), 211 Pac. 998, this court s.aid:
"The plain stipulations of the undertaking
of a surety company which is paid for undertaking
the risk will be enforced in its favor the same as
those of a gratuitous surety."
In Paxton v. Spencer, (Ut.), 265 Pac. 751, the rule
was reiterated in the following succinct language:
"The liability of the surety must be determined and measured by the terms of the bond."
Perhaps the most recent expression is found in BoisePayette Lumber Co. v. Phoenix Indemnity Co., (Ut.), 280
Pac. (2d) 418, where this court quoted with approval from
Blyth-Fargo Co. v. Free, supra, as follows:
" 'Appellant, like all others competent to contract, had the right to enter into just such a contract as it saw fit and to limit its obligations in
any particular it deemed proper, and, if the, company or contractor were dissatisfied with the
limitations contained in the bond as executed,
either, or both could refuse to accept it.' "
The Utah decisions are entirely harmonious with
the general rule as set forth by the text writers. See 50
Am. Jur. 1114-1115; 4 Williston on Contracts, pages
3491-2, 3547; 5 Couch's Cyclopedia of Insurance Law,
pages 4262 to 4267; Stearns, Law of Suretyship, Fifth
Ed. page.s 12, 13 and 107; Restatement of Security, Sec.
88.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

52
POINT VI.
FELT BEING A NON-RESIDEN'T CORPORATION AND
HAVING FORFEITED I TS ·CORPORATE FRANCHISE TO
DO BUSINESS IN THIS STA TE, HAS NO STANDING TO
MAINTAIN ITS ACTION IN THE U·TAH COURTS.
1

1

We previously noted that Felt was incorporated as a
Nevada corporation in the spring of 1950, and thereafter
qualified to do business in the State of Utah. In 1952,
prior to the commencement of the litigation between the
several lien claimants on the one hand and Felt, Prudential Federal and Hartford on the other, Felt forfeited
its franchise to do business in the State of Utah, for failure to pay taxes. Its franchise was subsequently reinstated in accordance with Utah law, but was again forfeited during the pendency of the instant litigation. It
has never been reinstated, and had not been reinstated
up to the time of trial of the cases at bar. It is the contention of the I-Iartford, First: That \Yhen Felt's corporate rights in Utah were forfeited for non-payment of
taxes, any rights which it then had were forever lost,
and could not be revived or reinstated by again qualifying to do business in Utah; and Secondly, even if such
rights were not forever lost, Felt in any event had no
right to maintain the instant suit against the Hartford
at a time when its corporate rights in l~tah had been
forfeited.
Se:e. 59-13-61, U.C.A., 1953, provides as follows:
''If a tax con1puted and levied hereunder is
not paid before 5 o'clock p.In. on the last day of
the eleventh n1onth after the date of delinquency,
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the corporate powers, rights .and privileges of the
delinquent taxpayer, if it is a domestic corporation, shall be suspended, and if a foreign corporation, it shall thereupon forfeit its rights to do
intrastate business in this state.'' (Italics ours.)
It will be noted that a distinction is made between
domestic and foreign corpor.a tions. Whereas, the rights
of domestic corporations are merely "suspended" for
non-payment of taxes, the rights of foreign corporations
are "forfeited." The words "suspend" and "forfeit" do
not earry the same legal significance, and it appears to
us quite obvious that the Legislature intended to make .a
distinction between the consequences of non-payment of
taxes on domestic and foreign corporations.
The significance to be attached to the word "suspend" was set forth by the Missouri Court in construing
a statute somewhat similar to ours in Leibson v. Henry,
356 Mo. 953, 204 S.W. (2d) 310, as follows:
" 'Suspend' ordinarily means temporary cessation; in its natural signification, something
which may not be permanent rather th.an that
which necessarily is so; ***"
The word "forfeit" carries .a different connotation.
In 23 Am. Jur., commencing at page 599, it is defined
as follows:
"In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a
divestiture of property without compensation, in
consequence of a default or an offense, and the
term is used in such a sense in this article. A
forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of
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punishment, not by the mere convention of the
p.arties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a
prescribed course of conduct."
And further:
"The primary and legal meaning of the word
'forfeit' is 'to lose.' ".
The following definitions are found in
Dictionary, 3rd Ed. :

Black'~

Law

"To lose an estate, a franchise, or other property belonging to one, by the act of the law, and
as a consequence of some misfeasance, negligence,
or omission. ***

"*** To incur loss through some fault, omis_sion, error, or offense; loss. ***"
There are many cases to the same effect. As illustrative we cite the following: State v. Cook, (La. App.),
13 So. (2d) 473, quoting \Vith approval the A1nerican
Jurisprudence definition above set forth; Rekas v. Dopkavich, 362 Pa. 292, 66 A. (2d) 230, \Vhere the court said:
"As a verb, 'forfeit' in its p-rimary sense
means 'to lose'; and that is also its legal meaning.
2'6 C.J. Sec. 4, p. 891, 37 C.J.S., Forfeit; 23 A1n.
J ur. Sec. 2, p. 599.",
and Sands v. I-Iolbert_. 93
the court said:

' T·

\~a.

574, 117 S.E. 896, where

"To forfeit is to incur loss through some fault,
o1nission, error, or offense. It is synon)~nous with
'loss.' "
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Under the plain and unequivocal language of the
statute, .any rights which Felt 1nay ever have had to proceed against the Hartford were forfeited and forever lost,
when its franchise was revoked for non-payment of taxes
in 1953. Sec. 16-9-3, U.C.A., 1953, sets forth the di.sabilities of non-complying foreign corporations. In so far
as material here, that statute provides as follows:
"Any foreign corporation doing business
within this state and failing to comply with the
provisions of Sections 16-8-1, and 16-8-2, shall not
be entitled to the benefit of the laws of this state
relating to corporations, and shall not sue, prosecute or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim,
cross complaint or proceeding in any of the courts
of this state on any claim, interest or demand
arising or growing out of or founded on any tort
occurring, or of any contract, agreement or transaction made or entered into, in this state by such
corporation or by its assignors or by any person
from, through or under whom it derives its interest or title or any part thereof." (Emphasis ours.)
Under this .statute, it is clear beyond question, that
Felt had no right to maintain the instant suit in the Utah
courts. Such is the uniform effect given to such statutes
wherever they have been construed by the courts. In
Aalwyns Law Institute v. Mart in, (Cal.), 159 Pac. 158,
the court said :
"When a corporation has failed to pay its
license tax, and a forfeiture of its charter has been
declared, it ceases to be a corporation." (Emphasis
ours.)
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In the later case of U.S.F. & G. Co. v. Matthews,
(Cal. App.), 274 Pac. 769, the court said:
"In consequence of the fact that in 1907 the
plaintiff corporation failed to pay its state corporation license tax, its corporate charter was
at that time forfeited."
And the court further ,said :
"That upon the forfeiture of the license of a
corporation it is dead, and, consequently, rendered
incapable of performing any act, is attested by a
long line of authoritie·s in this state. See Rossi v.
Claire, 186 ·Cal. 544, 549, 199 P. 1042; Sharp v.
Eagle Lake Lumber Co., 60 Cal. App. 386, 389,
212 P. 933; Crossman v. Vivienda Water Co., 150
Cal. 575, 580, 89 P. 335, Newhall v. Western Zinc
Min. Co., 164 Cal. 380, 128 P. 1040; \-.-an Langingham v. United Tuna Packers, 189 Cal. 353, 208 P.
973. It therefore becomes apparent that the corporation itself had no power to assign the judgment. ***

*

*

*

"In the case of Aalwyn's L.aw Institute v.
Martin, 173 Cal. 21, 159 P. 158, in principle it is
held that when a corporation has failed to pay its
license tax, and by reason thereof its charter has
been forfeited, the corporation is de·ad, and that in
its behalf the trustees of the corporation are the
only persons or representatives \vho have any
standing in court. It is therefore n1anifest that as
the corporation itself has no po\ver or capacity
to act in the prenrises, .and as its directors, acting
as trustees for the corporation, gave no notice of
appeal, the notice purporting to emanate fron1 the
corporation was a nullity. \renable Bros. v. Southern Granite ~c·o., 135 Ga. 508, 69 S.E. 822, 32 L.R.A.
(N.S.) 446."
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Perhaps the most recent decision on that subject
from that jurisdiction is Reed v. Norman) ( C.al. App.),
302 Pac. ( 2d) 690, where the court said :
"Respondents Norman and Haskins move to
dismiss plaintiff's appeal upon this ground: That
the complaint assert.s an alleged cause of action
belonging to defendant Norman Decorating Co.,
Inc., a domestic corporation, and plaintiff's action,
brought by him as a stockholder, is derivative in
nature; that the corporate right to do business
has been suspended for nonpayment of its franchise tax; that there has been no reinstatement or
revivor of that right, and hence the corporation
cannot pro.secute or defend any suit; ***
*

*

*

"During such suspension the corporate disability extends to the defense of an action and the
right of appeal from an adverse judgment. Boyle
v. Lakeview Creamery c·o., 9 C.al. 2d 16, 19-20-68
P. 2d 968; Fidelity lVIetal Corp. v. Risley, 77 Cal.
App. 2d 377, 383, 175 P. 2d 592. ***

* >Ill *
"*** As the court declared in the RansomeCrummey Co. v. Superior Court, supra, 188 ~c·al.
393, 397, 205 P. 446, 448: 'During the time its
taxes were unpaid, petitioner was shorn of all
rights save those expressly reserved by the statutes.' The conclusion which we are forced to draw
is that the appellant corporation has lost the right
to defend the suit in question, and since it has no
right to defend, it has no right to appeal from
an adverse decision. See, also 6A Cal. J ur. No.
864, p. 1469. That c.ase is controlling here. There
is no right to maintain this action."
See also the annotation in 97 A.L.R. pp. 483-484,
where it is said:
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"The power of a corporation to sue and to be
sued is extinguished at common law when its existence is terminated; and this extinction involves,
as a matter of procedure, the abatement of any
action to which it may he a party, pending at the
time of its dis.solution, or the bar of any subsequently commenced action."
The case closest in point of fact which our research
has discovered, and therefore the one we consider most
helpful on this point, is Leibson v. Henry; 356 1\Io. 953,
204 S.W. (2d) 310. In that case the Court construed the
provisions of .a l\1issouri statute, somewhat similar to our
own, 'vhich provided as follows:
"If any corporation shall fail to comply with
the provisions of this article on or before the
thirty-first day of December, the corporate rights
and privileges of such corporation shall be forfeited, and th.e Secretary of State shall thereupon
cancel the certificate, or license, of such corporation by .appropriate entry on the margin of the
record thereof, whereupon all the powers, privileges and franchises conferred upon such eorporation by such certificate, or license, shall subject
to rescission as in this article proYided, cease
and determine,***" (Emphasis ours.)
The court then quoted ''""'ith approval fron1 the decision in State v. A.B. Collins & Co., 3-± F. Supp. 550, as
follows:
"It vvould be difficult to conceive of any language 'vhich could be n1ore expressive of dissolution of corporate existence than the language used
in this statute. Failure to con1ply """ith the provisions of la,v, so says the statute, ipso facto results in the forfeiting of the corporate rights and
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privileges of such corporation. The Secretary of
State does not forfeit those rights and privileges.
They ,are ipso facto forfeited." (Emphasis ours.)
The court then went on to say:
"It is not even debatable that mere suspension
(to say nothing of forfeiture) of corporate powers
would of necessity so disable a corporation as
to bring about at least a temporary cessation of
its usual and ordinary business during the period
of suspension, bec.au.se in the absence of its franchise, or license, it could lawfully do nothing."
And it concluded as follows :
"From the plain language of the statute, and
upon the authority of the cases cited, our conclusion is that the effect of a forfeiture as provided
in section 5091 to ipso facto, completely conclude
the corporate entity, and without judicial action
except and subject to the right of re.scission upon
the .application and showing required by Sec.
5093."
POINT VII.
THE ;TITLE COMPANY DID NOT SUSTAIN ANY COMPENSABLE DAMAGE, AND THEREFORE IS NOT EN~
TITLED 'TO RECOVER ANYTHING FROM THE HARTFORD.

It is of course the general rule that attorneys' fees
are not recoverable items of damage unless specifically
stipulated for by contract, or unless authorized by some
special statute. It is stated thus in 15 Am. Jur. pp. 550-51,
Damages Sec. 142 :
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"As a gener.al rule, in the absence of any contractual or statutory liability therefor, attorneys'
fees and expenses incurr·ed by the plaintiff or
which the plaintiff is obligated to pay, in the litigation of his claim against the defendant, aside
from usual court costs, are not recoverable as an
item of damages, either in an action ex contractu
or an action ex delicto. Nor are attorneys' fees
and other expenses of former litigation, particularly suits prosecuted by the plaintiff against the
defendant, recoverable in a subseque1~t action."
(Emphasis ours.)
To the same effect in Oleck on Damages, p. 596, Sec.

287:
"As a general rule, litigation expenses and
costs are not recoverable as costs in actions at
law. This general rule appJies to such litig.ation
expenses as attorneys' fees."
The rule applies equally to prior litigation as to litigation then in suit. Oleck on Damages, p. 603, Sec. 290:
"The rule is also 'vell established that attorney fees and the ordinary expenses and burdens
of litigation are not allo,vable to the successful
party in the .absence of a statute, or in the absence
of .some agreen1ent or stipulation specially authorizing the allowance thereof, and this rule
applies equally in courts of la":-- and in courts of
equity."
The reasons for the rule are ''"'·ell explained by the
author at pages 605-607, Sec. 290 .as follows :
"The policy of the rule is obvious. If the
wrongful conduct of a defendant causing the
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pendent tort .and a separate cause of action, there
would be no end to the litigation, for immediately
upon the entry of judgment the plaintiff would
start another action against the defendant for
his attorney fees and expenses incurred in obtaining the preceding judgment. ***When a defendant
breache.s a lease, violates the terms of a contract,
commits a tort, misrepresents goods sold, unlawfully retains the personal property of the plaintiff, or remains in possession of real estate after
the expiration of his tenancy, necessitating proceedings, his conduct is wrongful and may require
.a suit against him by the plaintiff. Under our
jurisprudence the defendant may present any
defense to such an action that he may have or that
he may deem expedient, and in so doing he will
not be subjecting himself to a second suit by the
plaintiff based on the wrongful conduct of the defendant in causing the plaintiff to sue him or in
defending the .action. The rule is the same even
though the wrongful conduct of the defendant is
willful, intentional, malicious or fraudulent.
* * *
"*** It is obvious that if the defendant in the
Smith case, supra, could not maintain an action
for damages which he had suffered by an unfounded prosecution, the converse of the proposition would be true, that is, a plaintiff can not bring
an action against a defendant who has made a
groundless and causeless defense. Equal justice
forbids treating one party to a suit more generously than the other."
Utah is committed to this rule. See Dahl v. Prince,
119 Ut. 556, 230 P. (2d) 328, wher,e this court said:
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"With respect to the award of $200 for attorney fees as damages for depriving plaintiff of
possession by writ of attachment, the judgment
was clearly erroneou_s. There was no contract
involved which authorized the award of counsel
fees and there was no basis for .an award of punitive damages. See 15 Am. J ur. p. 551, 25 C.J.S.
Damages, Sec. 50, p. 531, and Drinkhouse v. Van
Ness, 202 Cal. 359, 260 P. 869. Cf. St. Joseph
Stock Yards Co. v. Love, 57 Utah 450, 195 P. 305,
25 ALR 569."
The title company has pointed neither to an·y contractual provision nor to any statute which 'vould circumvent the general rule and permit it to recover attorney~s
fee_s as general da1nages in this litigation. It stands in
exactly the same position as would have Prudential Federal, had it not had the benefit of title insurance, and had
had the expense of defending itself in the prior litigation.
In that suit, the legal acts of Prudential Federal were
called into question. Substantial rights "\Yere asserted
against it, not only concerning priority of liens but also
that Prudential Federal was holding certain monies
which should have been paid to others. lTltimately, Prudential Federal contributed $10,000 to"~ard a settlen1ent
of the lien claims. It see1ns clear beyond question that if
Prudential Federal had borne its o"\vn defense expenses
in the lien claim litigation, it could not no'v recover then1
from the Hartford, as an ite1n of general damages. We
do not see ho'v the title ron1pany can be in any better
position.
As to court co.sts, they are a'vnrded as of course to
the prevailing party. Ho,vever, in the prior litigation
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there was no prevailing party. There was a general
compromise of rights to• which all parties to that litigation
agreed. Therefore neither was entitled to recover costs
against the other. Since Prudential Federal could not,
under any view of the case, recover court costs in the
prior litigation, its insurer can be in no better position
in the instant suit.
CONCLUSION
The judgment in favor of Felt should be reversed
for the following reasons :
1. Felt was guilty of substantial and material
breaches of its contractual obligations to Hartford's
principal.

2. Felt was a co-adventurer with Hartford's principal and therefore has no right to recover against the
Hartford for loss of profits.
3. Prudential Federal was guilty of substantial and
mate-rial breaches, which under the terms of the bond
would defeat Felt's rights to recover against the Hartford.
4. Any rights which Felt may have acquired, were
forfeited under the terms and provisions of Sec. 59-1361, U. C.A., 1953.

5. F:elt has no standing to maintain this action in
the Utah Courts under the provisions of Sec. 16-9-3,
U.C.A. 1953.
The judgment in favor of Prudential Federal should
be reversed for the following reasons :
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1. Prudential F·ederal was. guilty of substantial
and material breaches of its contractual obligations.

2. Prudential Federal failed to take reasonable
.steps to mitigate its damages.
3. Felt was guilty of substantial and material
breaches of its contractual obligations, which under the
terms of the bond defeat any rights which Prudential
Federal might have against the Hartford.
The judgment in favor of the Title Company should
be reversed for the following grounds and reasons:
1. Both Felt and Prudential Federal were guilt~T of
sub.stantial and material breaches, \vhich under the terms
of the bond, defeat any rights which the Title Company
might assert against the Hartford.
2. The Title Company has not sustained any conlpensable damage.
In each case the judgments should be reversed with
directions to enter judg1nent in favor of the defendant
and against the plaintiff, no cau.se of action.
Respectfully submitted,
MORETON, CHRISTENSEN &
CHRISTENSEN
By

RAY R. CHRISTENSEN

Attorneys for Hartford Accident and
Indemnity Company
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